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When Democracy Is Not The Only Cultural Language


In characterizing itself as a “Jewish and democratic state,” Israel assumes a cultural complexity that is extraordinary within the field of Western democratic discourse.  That complexity demands distinctive categories of thought.

The conflict between religion and state is usually taken as a conflict over political power: who will be able to exercise power over whom?  But it can also be seen as a manifestation of cultural tension, in which religion must define itself vis à vis the “other.”  The tension is significant only for one who feels loyalty to both cultural systems; one lacking that dual loyalty will not be troubled by it.

Terminology

To begin with, we must define the terms “Judaism” and “democracy.”  Democracy can connote technical democracy, that is, a system of government, electoral procedures, etc.; alternatively, it can connote democracy as a culture and a value system.  The latter, in turn, can be construed narrowly or broadly, along a range extending from mere “tolerance” to a comprehensive educational vision.  Judaism manifests a similar duality.  Some see the state’s “Jewishness” as a technical matter: it is a state of the Jews; it is a secular-Zionist state; or, at most, it is a state that must look to the halakhah in certain narrow and well defined areas, such as personal-status law.  These definitions will minimize the friction between “Judaism and democracy.”  But if the state’s “Jewishness” is construed more broadly—whether as an all-embracing system of obligatory norms or as a comprehensive, particularistic worldview—the potential for conflict will increase.

The conflict that has arisen in Israel between Judaism and democracy has generated a range of responses.  In the following typology of those responses, I have drawn on the work of Mary Douglas, in her book Natural Symbols.

 Between Religious Culture and Democratic Culture


Religious Culture Democratic Culture


The model describes two different cultural communities and their component strata and colorations: “religious culture,” shown at the top of the chart, comprises four sectors labeled A to D; “democratic culture,” shown at the bottom of the chart, comprises four sectors labeled E to H.  Each sector represents a stance having its own understanding of the terms “Judaism” and “democracy,” and it follows that the degrees of friction between them will vary.  What is striking is that the Haredi, anti-democratic position A is similar in cultural form to the democratic, anti-religious position H.  Corresponding similarities can be identified between opposing positions B and G, C and F, and D and E.

          
Sector A represents a closed, conservative religious position that rejects any link between itself and democracy.  It regards democracy and Judaism as two contradictory cultures—an assessment in which it is joined by Sector H, its counterpart in the democratic culture. We find this perspective within the most consistently segregationist Haredi society and within ideologically secular society.  Neither position takes a pragmatic view of the complex, real-world encounter between Jewish and democratic civilization.

Sector B represents the pragmatic position within Haredi society, a position conditioned on its understanding of democracy as merely technical and of Judaism as a broad system of values and norms.  (That is the position taken, for example, by Agudat Yisra’el).  Its analog within democratic culture is Sector G; it, too, represents a position that does not recoil from the cultural “other” (in its case, Judaism), but it forges its connection with Judaism by making it into something merely technical.  For example, it allocates it a narrow sphere of influence as defined by the Israeli legislature, such as the authority to adjudicate personal status issues.

Sector C represents a form of religious discourse that posits loyalty to both Judaism and democracy as broad cultural systems, a dual loyalty that necessarily entails a tension to be resolved. Within religious culture, the tension will require religion to respond to some of democracy’s demands; still, democracy will be taken only as a post- facto reality, and the response will be correspondingly limited and local.

Within democratic culture, Sector F will experience a similar struggle.  Its position will grant Judaism broad and important cultural standing, but it will be able to do so only through a reductionism that assimilates the principles of Judaism into democratic culture.  Anything that cannot be assimilated will be rejected.

Of all the sectors within religious culture, Sector D is the closest to democratic culture.  Its approach sees democracy as grounded in Jewish sources.  Moreover, it regards democracy as a vital and inseparable element of Judaism’s educational and cultural ethos.

Analogously, Sector E, situated within democratic culture, takes a positive view of the connection between “Jewish” and “democratic,” seeing Judaism as a “watchdog” for democratic values.

Concluding Thoughts

The model’s power lies in its ability to illuminate the nature of the multi-cultural project pertaining to Judaism and democracy.  The effort make democracy the backbone of society as a whole is similar, in cultural form, to the Haredi approach that seeks to base everything on religion, oblivious to the presence of the “other.” The link between Jewish culture and democracy can be treated in a manner that ranges from disregard or disparagement all the way to valued partnership that does not demand cultural suicide from either side. This is a cultural project that demands authenticity and confidence within the Jewish world as well as the ability to form profound linkages with the democratic world and to internalize them without becoming assimilated into them.  The State of Israel must accomplish this as a sovereign state; Diaspora Jewry must accomplish this in the context of communal education.  This effort is at the heart of Jewish life as it confronts the “other.”

This article is a brief  summary of Dr. Rosenak's article "State and Religion: Inter-Cultural Tension Between Judaism and Democracy" (Hebrew), in Religion and State in Twentieth-Century Jewish Thought.


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False premises

Posted by Anonymous User at May 25, 2008 03:25
Assuming that hareidi attitudes are mono-dimentional is the basic error of this article. Torah study produces sophisticated responses to challenges, that do not fit into the categories delineated. There might be no contradiction in an absolute rejection of The state and total involvement in the democratic process, and Rav Shach is a perfect example.
Consider too that those who reject Judaism as a value tend to reject even personal status as an Area for jewish expression and tend to total intolerance of Any Jewish experience or values.

The categories are false

Posted by Anonymous User at May 25, 2008 04:00
In actual meetings with Secular Israelis, the attitudes tended to overlap and be self contradictory. Few Secular Israelis see the essential contradictions between Democracy and Judaism, and assume that both are part of an identity, without allocating specific roles to either.
Areas of conflict are more percieved emotionally than rationally, and it is the essentially irrational aspect of secular identity that has caused it to evaporate.
For Evaporate it has. Most Israelis are involved in a search for a greater Jewish identity. While this does not show up in most polls, but then neither do election results, it is clear to anyone who meets large numbers of Israelis, regularly.
As compared to twenty or ten years ago, all the secular definitions of Secular Israelis are obsolete.
Even secular Israelis prefer to define themselves as striving for an increased Jewish Identity. This happens to be the internal definition of Hareidim: Not Jewish enough yet, not Knowledgable enough yet and not applying enough of that knowledge yet.
No Jewish definition that is static is valid.
Judaism is a Process, not a State.

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